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Synopsis 
This paper outlines an attempt to design a model of CO2 reduction: “feebate”. 
The impact of feebate is evaluated by change in living expenditure. 
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Abstract 
After the Kyoto Conference (COP3), the Japanese transport sector was required 
to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by 16%  by 2010.  The Japanese 
government has decided to improve the fuel economy standard in 2010 by 
improving it by an average of 22.8%.  However, Japanese consumers tend to prefer 
heavier passenger cars such as four-wheel drive or recreational vehicles.  Because of 
the difficult target of COP3, environmental policy should involve not only 
automotive technologies but also non-technical measures.   
Since Japanese vehicle taxes are expensive compared to other OECD countries, 
we would like to introduce the “feebate”, a word composed from “fee” and “rebate”, 
as a “Green Tax” at the acquisition stage. The feebate system charges a fee for less 
fuel-efficient vehicles and refunds for vehicles more fuel efficient than the fuel 
efficiency standard.  This system is a market based alternative by fuel efficiency 
standards so that it can be tax neutral.  Acquisition tax does not affect  to 
environmental sustainability. Since social marginal cost has  increased more and 
more, it is not always realistic to impose all the costs at the motoring tax level. The 
feebate system could partially share the social marginal cost and might mitigate the 
rebound effect at the motoring stage.  
We use the data set from 1995-2001 on fuel efficiency by vehicle type and the 
fuel efficiency standards of 1995. The contribution of this paper will be to propose a 
combination of feebate rate and CO2 emission reduction by vehicle gross weight 
group.    
   4
1  Introduction 
1.1.  Overview of Japanese strategy for CO2 reduction and the trend in the 
year 2000.  
      The Japanese transport sector has been required to reduce carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emissions by 16% by 2010. The new strategy of CO2 reduction of the 
Japanese government emphasizes modal shift, fuel economy improvement and the 
top runner method as measures.  In  these technical measures, the Japanese 
government reduces the acquisition tax for clean energy vehicles, such as electric or 
natural gas powered vehicles. The government started a labelling system in 2000 of 
from 1 to 3 stars according to emission and fuel standards. Vehicles with 
environmentally higher performance receive more stars. In 2001, the government 
linked the 3 star to the vehicle taxation system Japan also offers a separate reduction 
in the acquisition tax and vehicle taxes for vehicles that meet certain emission and 
fuel economy targets. The tax incentives for low-emission vehicles raised the sales 
of low-emission vehicles by 63% from 2000 to 2001. However, CO2 emissions are 
growing rapidly. The emissions have increased by 21% in 2000 from the level of 
1990, which means that Japan has to reduce 4 % more than that estimate. 
There are several reasons why CO2 emissions have increased rapidly.  First, 
GDP and other factors affect car ownership and car ownership affects vehicle 
kilometre distance. Second, the average fuel economy has improved so that the 
consumer may drive longer distance (The rebound effect). Third, a tax reform of the 
year 1989 let consumers purchase heavy passenger vehicles. Since 1994, sales of 
sport utility vehicles (SUV) have boomed and so energy consumption and annual   5
traffic volume have increased. 
The Japanese national strategy may have expected too much from on 
technological progress. The question arises as to what extent these relationships are 
modified by transportation and environmental policies.  This paper is an attempt to 
introduce a non-technical system called “Feebate” to complement the technical 
measures.  
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Figure 1￿JARI car stock model 
 
2. Fuel economy regulation in Japan 
2.1 Total marginal CO2 emissions by fuel regulation scenario  
 There are only two fuel efficiency regulations and one voluntary agreement all 
over the world.  The US regulation “CAFE” set average fuel efficiency as a standard 
level. European voluntary agreement set a unique limit of CO2 emission for each 
vehicle.  The most significant characteristic of Japanese fuel economy regulation is   6
nine standards by nine weight class categories. The government concerned equality 
between weight classes to carry out the standard by weight class.  On April 1
st, 
2000, new Japanese fuel economy standards for gasoline and diesel passenger cars 
were carried out toward a 2010 goal￿16% of CO2 reduction. 
The disadvantage of the Japanese regulation is the low incentive for weight 
reduction because the heavier car category has a lower improvement rate.  Some 
manufacturers may shift their products to the heavier category.  This would make it 
easier to respect the fuel efficiency regulation. Weight reduction requires high 
research and development costs.   
Another disadvantage of the Japanese regulation is the lack of integration 
between the fuel efficiency regulation and other regulations, which affect increases 
in weight and fuel consumption.  The proposed scenarios are more severe fuel 
economy values for gasoline passenger cars, because the scenarios integrate road 
security and emissions gas regulations.  Here are the three scenarios developed from 
the fuel economy standard of 1995.  Each scenario has a different technological 
improvement and diffusion rate (Table 1). 
Table 1: Scenario description 
Scenarios  Summary of the description 
Regulatio
n 
Fuel economy standard 2010 + Safety + Noise 
+ Emission standard 2005 
Environm
ent 
Estimation of Environmental Agency 
Technolo
gy 
Maximum rate of technological improvement 
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Figure 2 is the result of the scenario descriptions. Scenarios “regulation” and 
“technology” are based on data of the MOT report. The Scenario “environment” is 
made by using the data of the Environmental Agency Report.  
The Scenario “regulation” supports technologies based on safe car bodies, safety 
devices, and ITS technologies in the market. The scenario “environmental 
regulation” includes emission gas regulation and noise regulation. Through noise 
control by both vehicle technology and road infrastructure, the noise of motor 
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2.3.  Feebate level per vehicle by scenario 
What level is optimal for fuel economy scenarios in terms of CO2 reduction?  In 
this section, optimal feebate levels will be calculated.  The following equations (1) 
and  (2)  describe the simulation of feebate revenue based on the fuel economy 
scenario.  
The total of car sales 2000-2010 is estimated by JARI model. Under the total cat 
stock, each weight class is maximized the number of car (1).  According to the 
JAMA market survey for passenger vehicles, the report point out that the life style 
has something to do with car choice. For example, housewives tend to drive mini 
cars. Elderly men prefer compact type of vehicle. Their preferences are weighted 




1 ...... cs cs cs cs CS + + + + =∑
= l
     (1) 
With respect to  the cost of fuel economy improvement, the Department of 
Energy in the US estimates the costs of the parts.  With respect to technological 
progress, JARI report 1999
4 and JAMA estimate the rate of improvement.  Using 
these two kinds of data, we estimate the average cost of fuel- efficiency 
improvement.  It costs 1995US $84 per vehicle to improve fuel economy by 1 %.  It 
costs 1995US $89 for a 2-3 % fuel efficiency improvement.  It costs US$101 for 4 
% in fuel efficiency improvement.  It costs US 1995 $125 for more than 4% in fuel 
economy improvement. Using sales of the year 1995 and their fuel economy values, 
we can determine feebate revenue by vehicle weight.   
                                                        
4 Minato Kiyoyuki. (1999). JARI Report 1999. Tsukuba: Japan Automobile Research Institute.  








− =      (2)  
FR:  feebates revenue 
FEreal:  fuel economy of a car 
FEstandard: fuel economy standard 
fee: cost of fuel economy improvement 
cs: Car sales by category  k:number of  car by category    k=1~9 
n: improvement rate  n=1-4 
 
If severer fuel efficiency standard is introduces, CO2 emissions will be reduced. 
The safety regulation scenario reduces by 2.3% per year from the fuel efficiency 
standard 2010 (BAU). Environment scenario reduces by 11.5% of CO2 emissions. 
Technology scenario reduces by 24.8% from BAU. 
How about the levels of fee and rebate change ? The feebate
5 system adjusts 
prices of new cars in favour of fuel consumption. Gas-guzzlers are charged fees. 
Gas sippers get rebates.  Feebate encourages both consumers and producers to 
choose fuel-efficient vehicles. In the short term, price incentives encourage 
consumers to buy cheaper, more fuel-efficient vehicles.  Demand-side responses 
influence total vehicle sales. This effect is reflected in the sales-weighted average of 
fuel consumption.  
Figure 3  is a result of our calculation on fee and rebate per vehicle.  The closer 
to the year 2010, the higher the fee the consumer has to pay. The level of rebate does 
not climb as high when compared to the fee level, but it may be an incentive to buy 
a less energy consumptive car. When the costs are divided by the number of cars in 
the upper range of each scenario, which is the rebate by scenario.  
                                                        


































3  IMPACT OF FEEBATES ON LIVING EXPENDITURE 
3.1.  Estimates of private car and maintenance expenditure 
If consumers became aware of the advantages of purchasing fuel-efficient cars, 
producers would manufacture fuel-efficient cars. The incentives of feebate also 
affect the supply side
6. In the long run, car manufactures will tend to produce more 
                                                        
6 U.S. Department of Energy. (1995). Effects of feebates on vehicle fuel economy, carbon dioxide emissions, and consumer surplus. 
February, IX-X.  
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fuel-efficient cars because feebates may help pay for additional fuel-economy 
technology.   
If optimal feebate levels are introduced in Japan, how will it impact living 
expenditure?  In this section, we discuss the effects of changes of annual vehicle 
purchase costs on living expenditure per household.  Impacts on living expenditure 
must be different on fee and rebate sides in the case that a consumer buys a vehicle 
once between 2001 and 2010.  
The trend of expense per household could be expressed as a Constant Elasticity 
System Function (CES function). The CES function provides us for the elasticity, 
coefficient of vehicle diffusion and coefficient of efficiency, which determine annual 
cost for a private vehicle. Supposing that the cost of a private car consists of 
purchase X and maintenance costs Y￿3￿.   
ρ ρ ρ δ δ γ
1
) ) 1 ( (
−
− − − + = Y X U             ￿3￿ 
X: average price of a private vehicle  
Y: annual maintenance cost   
U: annual cost for a private vehicle  
ρ :  elasticity 
δ :  coefficient of vehicle diffusion 
γ :   coefficient of efficiency 
 
       For the projection from 2001 to 2010, the expenditure on a private car 
increased at average rate of 6.7% between 1976 and 1998. The function is linearized 
by Taylor’s series. While price change will influence expenditure in the same period 
in the static model, the time lag between price change and expenditure will be 
considered in the dynamic model. This is because car purchase cost increases when 
the income of the previous year increases. The time lag “polynomial distributed lag   12
model” Ut-1 is integrated in equation (4) If the car price changes, the effect of car 
price is supposed to influence purchase cost next year. 
1
2
3 2 1 0












+ + + =   (4) 
where  t U* log  is estimated expenditure in period i. 
2 1
*
1 ) log (log log log t t t t t U U U U ε θ + + = − − −      (5) 
Where,  
γ β log 0 =    δ β = 1    δ β − =1 2
  ) 1 (
2
1
3 δ ρδ β − − =  
U: utility (annual purchase cost of private car)  
X: price of private car  
Y: maintenance cost of private car  
ε : disturbance 
t : time 
θ  is adjustment speed.  1 0 ≤ ≤θ   θ =0.8 
From (5) and (6), it yields (7) 
t t t U
Y
X











⎛ + + + = −1
2
3 2 1 0 log ) 1 ( log log log     
(6) 
where                    2 1 t t ε θε ε + =  
The estimation of the dynamic model is as follows: ( )=t  value.  Under  the 
feebate system, the fee is added to the car price, while the car price is reduced on the 
rebate side in X’.   
t t t U
Y
X











⎛ + + + − = −1
2
log 7 . 13 log 340 . 0 log 306 . 0 ' log 663 . 0 686 . 4
 (7)                         (4.034)          (1.888)                   (21.923)                          (0.831)          
(7.223)   13
      ￿‘￿car price + fee, car price -rebate 
R
2 = 0.981  Adjusted R
2 = 0.976 
Durbin Watson statistics = 2.45 
         In order to estimate impacts on living expenditure, data of the annual report 
on the family income and expenditure survey
7 is used for purchase cost projection 
toward 2010.  In 1995, most real fuel economy on new gasoline passenger car sales 
was below the fuel economy standard of 2010. All new cars are supposed to clear 
the fuel economy standard of 2010 or the three scenarios by 2010. 
         The annual expenditure on gasoline passenger car purchase was between 
1.51% and 1.84 % during 1987-1995.  Introduction of the feebate system diversifies 
expenditures of the gasoline passenger car between the fee and rebate sides.  A 
consumer who buys a gas sipper vehicle reduces expenditure to less than 1.84%. A 
consumer who buys a gas-guzzler vehicle has to pay more than 1.84%. 
It is clear that a more severe standard, or FE scenario, allows higher CO￿ 
reduction. However, higher reduction requires a higher fee. The exponential curves 
are fee levels. The linear curves are rebates. The rebate level is not high enough, but 
imposition of the fee may be an incentive, in itself, to buy a more fuel-efficient car. 
When a consumer buys a better FE car, he/she can reduce living expenditure 
purchase costs. If we look at the figure by time intervals, we see the fee level 
increase by 2-3 times from 2001 to 2009. Rebate levels grow 1.3-1.7 times from 






                                                        














       
 
 
Figure 4  Impact of feebates on living expenditure 
 
4 CONCLUSION  
               Technological progress and diffusion rates determine fuel economy 
scenarios towards 2010.  Exogenous factors, such as safety and noise, are added 
(Security Regulation scenario).  The Japanese Environmental Agency‘s scenario 
follows the same scenarios without the security and noise factors (Environment 
scenario).  The technological scenario is developed simply by technological 
advancement (Technology scenario). Following the classification of top runner 
methods, three different scenarios of fuel economy improvement are introduced in 
the simulation of feebate.  Since new car sales depend on consumer preference, 
drivers’ genders and generations are integrated for the projection.  The feebate 
distorts car price, which impacts living expenditure.  









2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
%
Fee  FE  Standard 2010 Fee  Secur i ty
Fee  Env Fee  Technol ogy
Rebate   FE  standard Rebate   Secur i ty 
Rebate   Envi ronm ent Rebate   Technol ogy   15
 More severe fuel economy scenarios emit less CO2. Among the three scenarios, 
the technology scenario is the severest. However, reduction cost will increase in 
order to stabilize the CO2 level by 2010. In consequence, the technology scenario 
has the highest feebate level. For those who buy fuel-efficient vehicles, car price is 
reduced by the feebate system. For those who buy less efficient vehicles, car price 
will be raised. Since Japan has to complete the target by 2010, impacts on living 
expenditure will gradually increase by 2009. 
For further development of the model, some issues, such as follow-up, should be 
considered. Fuel efficiency does not mean CO2 reduction directly. A consumer who 
buys a fuel-efficient vehicle may drive longer distances. That causes increase of CO2 
emissions.  For reduction of CO2 emissions, feebate should be combined with not 
only acquisition tax, but also other vehicle taxes. With respect to technological 
aspects, clean energy vehicles such as hybrid vehicles and fuel cell vehicles will be 
launched into the market. The vehicle tax system should be reformed to encourage 
consumers to buy clean energy vehicles. In this paper, the consumer side is the 
focus. Impacts on intra-industry or inter-industry should be evaluated, too.   16
 
APPENDIX 1 New car sales projection (the number of cars) 
 2000 2001 2002  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  2008 2009 2010
750 362232 344917 326194  306004 284290 260988 236037 209369  180917 177073 118377
875 640710 662516 685063  708378 732486 757415 783192 809846  837408 865907 895376
1000 916280 947463 979708 1013051 1047528 1083179 1120042 1158161  1197576  1238334 1280478
1250 1194240 1202607 1211032  1219517 1228061 1236665 1245329 1254054 1262839 1271687 1280596
1500 973540 974514 975488  976464 977440 978418 979396 980375  981356 982337 983319
1750 403724 404127 404531  404936 405341 405746 406152 406558  406965 407372 407779
2000 47476 47523 47571  47618 47666 47714 47761 47809  47857 47905 47953
2250 8673 8682 8691  8699 8708 8717 8725 8734  8743 8752 8760
2500 629 630 630  631 632 632 633 634 634 635 635
 
APPENDIX 2 Feebates revenue (1995 US $) 
  IW750kg IW875kg  IW1000kg  IW1250kg  IW1500kg  IW1750kg  IW2000kg  IW2250kg  IW2500kg 
Standard 
2010 
44490856 40671067 83207136 1.28E+08 1.21E+08 50127162  5897387  1010050  78058 
Regulation  47961226 57619872 84173170 1.28E+08 1.21E+08 50130822  5899883  1078750  78250 
Environment 51917261 67292479 91157178 1.41E+08 1.21E+08 50203564  5904875  1078750  78250 
Technology  53693125 67292479 94239071 1.44E+08 1.21E+08 50213875  5904875  1078750  78250 
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APPENDIX3 Fee and rebate per vehicle  
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  2008 2009
Fee-Standard 2010   313  352 403 470 565 707 943  1416  2571
Fee-Security 336  379 433 506 608 760 1015  1523  2774
Fee-Environment 460  517 592 691 829 1037 1384  2075  3787
Fee-Technology 663  746 853 997 1197 1497 1998  3000  5494
Rebate-Standard 2010  287  256 250 211 193 179 166  155  146
Rebate-Security 325  289 260 236 216 199 185  173  162
Rebate-Environment 499  437 389 351 319 293 270  251  234
Rebate-Technology 728  637 567 510 464 425 393  365  340
 
APPENDIX 4 Impact on living expenditure: Change of annual purchase cost in living expenditure 
(%) 
urchase cost/living expenditure)%  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006  2007  2008 2009
Fee  FE Standard 2010  2.2 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.5  2.7  3.1 4.0
 Security  2.3 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6  2.8  3.2 4.2
 Environment  2.4 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.9  3.1  3.7 5.0
 Technology  2.7 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.3  3.7  4.5 6.4
Rebate   FE standard  1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7  1.7  1.7 1.7
 Security   1.4 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6  1.7  1.7 1.7
 Environment  1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5  1.6  1.6 1.6
 Technology   0.9 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4  1.5  1.5 1.6
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